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Taiwan: The Security Policy of the
Chen Government Since 2000
Mathieu Duchâtel
1 Important new factors have appeared in the strategic equation in the Taiwan Strait
since Chen Shui-bian became President of the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan in
2000.  The accelerated modernisation of the People's  Liberation Army (PLA) and the
passing of the Anti-Secession Law have increased Chinese irredentist pressure on the
island. After the election of George W. Bush, the United States increased its military co-
operation with Taiwan, but American support remains ambiguous, especially as some
of Chen Shui-bian's  political  initiatives,  his  inability  to impose his  arms acquisition
policy on the legislative Yuan (Parliament), and a defence budget which is shrinking in
relative  terms have  provoked irritation in  Washington.  In  addition,  Japan has  now
become an important  but  discreet  player  in  the  security  triangle.  In  this  changing
environment, Chen Shui-bian has followed the broad lines of Lee Teng-hui's security
policy.  Where  defence  is  concerned,  in  the  six  years  of  his  presidency,  the  major
innovation  has  been  the  Taiwanese  army's  efforts  to  take  on  board  some  of  the
technologies of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)1, along with greater attention
being focused on dissuasive retaliation capacity.  In order to implement his security
policy, Chen Shui-bian, as the first President not to command a Parliamentary majority
in the Yuan, and in a context of highly polarised political debate, has to face a sizeable
constraint:  a  domestic  opposition  that  has  the  power  to  block  part  of  his  arms
acquisition policy.
Taiwan, a « defensive » power
2 The Taiwanese  Minister  for  Defence  has  given the  following  definition  of  Taiwan's
security:  “With  the  progress  of  globalisation  and  information  technology,  national
security has evolved from focusing narrowly on military security to looking at broader
pluralistic  security  issues,  which  include  national  defence,  diplomacy,  cross-Strait
affairs,  the  economy,  technology,  psychology,  the  environment,  and  crisis
management”2. This definition is part of a worldwide trend towards the widening of the
concept of security since the 1980s3. Security policies cannot be conceived as merely a
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maximisation of military power through strategies of armament or of alliance. This
wider approach leads to conceiving security as a state to be achieved by the security
policy,  and which can be  defined as  “the lack  of  military  and non-military  threats
which could call into question the core values which a person or a community wishes to
preserve or promote, and which lead to the risk of the use of force”4. Taipei has made
this approach its own. The means of its security policy are various. Nevertheless, as the
ministry  indicates  in  its  2002  White  Paper,  its  security  policy,  while  it  cannot  be
reduced to military means, relies on them above all5. Like that of Lee Teng-hui, but with
slightly different means and in a context which has evolved, the Taiwanese security
policy of the Chen administration towards the People's Republic also means an analysis
from a security perspective of all the aspects of cross-Strait relations. The episode of
the giant pandas offered as a gift to Taiwan by China on the occasion of Lien Chan's
visit to the mainland, and which were criticised by the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC)
as being part of “United Front” (tongzhan) strategy, is a good example6. The claim laid
by  the  Republic  of  China  (ROC)  to  the  status  of  sovereign  state  makes  this  choice
necessary and rational, for reasons we will explain below.
3 In the 2004 White Paper the ROC's Minister of Defence defined three main security
objectives: safeguarding the integrity of national sovereignty, securing the sustainable
development of the nation, and preventing any military conflict in the Taiwan Strait7.
Moreover, the island's security policy serves the national interests of Taiwan, which
are the protection of the survival and development of the Nation, the safeguarding of
the security and well-being of the population, and the defence of liberty, democracy
and human rights on the island8. As with any other sovereign state, safeguarding the
integrity of national sovereignty is at the top of the hierarchy of security objectives.
Nevertheless, in the specific context of the Taiwan Strait, this hierarchy is a reminder
that the status of Taiwan—the question of whether it is a state or a rebellious province
—lies at the heart of the political conflict and the danger of war between the two sides.
In Taiwan, under Chen Shui-bian as under Lee Teng-hui, and even under Chiang Kai-
shek,  the irredentist  claim of  Beijing has always been perceived as  the core of  the
Chinese threat. But to the Chen administration, the slogan “one country, two systems”,
the idea of an indivisible sovereignty of Chinese territory which makes it possible to
define secessionist activity9 is a direct challenge to the perception by Taipei of the ROC
in Taiwan as a state which is already sovereign and independent (zhuquan duli)10.
4 Taiwanese  security  policy  is  thus  built  on  three  pillars:  the  defence  of  the  ROC's
sovereignty,  the  prevention  of  war  and  of  Chinese  coercive  strategies,  and  the
maintenance  of  the  island's  political,  social  and  economic  system.  Among  these
mainsprings,  sovereignty  appears  as  the  matrix,  in  the  sense  that  its  defence  is
undertaken on all fronts. The People's Republic is far more powerful than Taiwan if one
refers to the two criteria generally used by the realist school to measure the power of a
state  in  the  international  system,  which  is  to  say  the  size  of  its  economy and the
resources  it  allocates  to  the  military  sphere11.  Nevertheless  Chen  Shui-bian's
administration has not yielded to Beijing's political demands. It has not accepted either
the One China principle, or the 1992 consensus 12; nor has it accepted the “one country,
two systems” slogan. It has therefore continued to declare that the ROC in Taiwan is a
sovereign  and  independent  state,  in  accordance  with  the  strategy  adopted  by  the
Democratic  Progressive  Party  (DPP)  in  the  “Resolution  for  the  future  of  Taiwan”
(Taiwan qiantu jueyiwen) in 199913. It must be recognised that up to now, Taiwan has
still been able not to yield to the Chinese irredentist claim, and that the difference in
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power between the two shores cannot be reduced to their size, their population, or to
the  number  of  men  in  their  armed  forces.  Thus  Taiwan  today  has  real  “defensive
power”, in the meaning used by Raymond Aron, that of the “ability of a political unit to
resist the imposition of the will of others”14. But how much longer can this last?
5 Defensive power is a political science concept, but in the case of Taiwan, it is based on
the island's military capability, and on its defence co-operation with the United States.
The concept of the asymmetry of power, developed for case of Taiwan by Wu Yu-shan,
sheds  interesting  light  on  Taiwan's  strategic  behaviour.  The  concept  applies  to
situations  where  a  conflict  over  sovereignty  brings  together  two  political  units  of
widely  differing  size15.  In  this  situation,  the  smaller  political  unit  is  faced  with  a
strategic  alternative;  it  can  choose  between  “balancing”  (kangheng),  or  else
“bandwagoning” (fucong) with the more powerful entity16. Under Chen Shui-bian, the
Taiwanese  authorities  clearly  favour  the  first  of  these  strategies.  The  Minister  of
Defence, Lee Jye explains that “without solid capacity and without real determination
(…), peace in the Strait cannot be assured, despite all our good will”17.  In Taiwanese
security  policy  today,  there  co-exist  the  two  forms  of  balancing  which  structural
realism distinguishes on the theoretical level: internal balancing, which concentrates
on developing  military  resources  and the  overall  wealth  of  the  state,  and external
balancing, which favours alliances. Neorealist texts could have foreseen such strategic
behaviour on the part of Taiwan, in the context of the increasing power of what is both
its  largest  and closest  neighbour.  Kenneth Walzer's  theory of  the balance of  power
states that the political units in a system will systematically seek to counterbalance the
increase  in  power of  other  units18.  Stephen Walt's  theory of  the balance of  threats
posits that the political units in one system counterbalance as a priority not the states
which are perceived as potential hegemons, but the states whose foreign policy most
threatens their interests19.
The relative evolution of Taiwanese defence strategy
6 Under Chen Shui-bian, the theatre of operations of a possible conflict with China has
been subjected to a relatively new perception compared to the era of Lee Teng-hui.
Geographically, Taiwan is in an advantageous position; its insularity protects it from
invasion by the PLA20. Nevertheless, the consolidation of the protection of the nerve
centres  of  political  and  military  decision-making—as  well  as  of  certain  economic
activities—against  Chinese  missile  attacks,  and  the  reinforcement  of  the  island's
defences against attack from the air, for example by the recent deployment of batteries
of Avenger missiles in the Taipei region, have been one of the new administration's
priorities21. This is justified by the increasing pressure brought to bear on the island by
the  modernisation  of  the  PLA's  long  range  capability  and  the  ever-increasing
deployment of Chinese ballistic missiles pointing at Taiwan22.
7 Above all, we have witnessed a determining evolution in the strategic doctrine of the
island's  armed  forces.  In  over  a  decade,  the  Taiwanese  army  has  moved  from  a
conception focused on the defence of Taiwanese territory, to seeking control over the
air and maritime space in the Strait, combined with a possible extension of the conflict
to  the  Chinese  mainland.  This  development  is  subtle,  insofar  as  Taipei  has  always
sought to prevent combat taking place on the island's soil. Since Taiwan renounced the
reconquest of the Chinese mainland by force in 1991, there have been two competing
military  strategies  to  block  any  PLA  offensive.  The  first  emphasises  anti-landing
capacity (WWW, fan denglu) and the army. The second aims at spreading the conflict to
Taiwan: The Security Policy of the Chen Government Since 2000
China Perspectives, 64 | march - april 2006
3
the Chinese mainland, and on the contrary favours offensive equipment. Since 2000,
some elements of the second approach have been applied. The reconstruction of the
ROC's armed forces shows this evolution.
8 In 2000, after the election of Chen Shui-bian, Taiwanese defence doctrine changed from
“effective  deterrence,  resolute  defence”  to  “resolute  defence,  effective  deterrence”
(youxiao hezu, fangwei gushou). Behind this inversion is to be seen a new perception of
space in the Strait. The first concept, which was applied under Lee Teng-hui, suggested
that if the PLA crossed the Strait of Taiwan in order to launch an amphibious attack, it
would suffer very high casualties. Thus the deterrence was focused on invasion. Behind
the second concept, in contrast, lies the idea that all the forms of Beijing's coercive
strategy  (whether  a  blockade,  missile  strikes,  or  attacks  on  Jinmen,  Mazu  or  the
Pescadores) must be deterred. As it has been emphasised by the ex-Deputy Minister of
Defence, Michael Tsai Ming-hsien, Taiwanese doctrine now consists of introducing an
element of doubt among Chinese military decision-makers. It also rests on the basic
principle of dissuasion of the strong by the weak: what Taiwanese response could be
triggered by these coercive options23? Under Chen Shui-bian, the administration has
undertaken consideration of active defence, putting forward the doctrine of “decisive
war beyond the borders” (juezhan jingwai). As early as during his speech on June 16th
2000 at  the Military Academy, the President declared that Taiwan must develop its
military capability in the sense of “high precision strikes, early warning capability, and
intelligence  superiority,  basing  itself  on  the  objective  of  winning  a  decisive  battle
outside our territory”24.  With the same aim, the Minister of Defence has elaborated
several  tactical  concepts:  pre-emptively  maintaining  superiority  on  the  levels  of
electronic technology and intelligence, pushing back unlimited hostile engagements far
from the  coast,  carrying  out  joint  air  and  sea  operations,  ensuring  the  security  of
ground operations, preventing enemy intrusion, preserving the lifespan of armaments
and slowing enemy offensives with effective counter-measures25. While it is now clear
that Taiwan's main objective consists of keeping any conflict away from the island's
coasts,  a  new ambiguity  now surrounds the question of  whether  Taiwan is  moving
towards active defence properly speaking, which is to say preventive strikes against
Chinese  ballistic  sites,  for  example.  Offensive  defence,  in  the  form  of  a  dissuasive
counter-attack on the mainland, has received political support at the highest level, but
it remains highly controversial and something in the nature of a calculated strategic
ambiguity26.  The Chen administration is  clearly  seeking to  acquire  certain weapons
which are central to its application, such as submarines or intermediate range cruise
missiles. The Taiwanese armed forces are presently entrenched behind the concept of
“no first strike”. But it cannot be ruled out that they will carry out counter-offensives
on the Chinese mainland if a military conflict breaks out, even though, in the case of
American intervention, Washington could demand that the conflict not be extended to
the Chinese coast.
Defence programmes currently under way
9 An ambitious programme to modernise the military is currently under way. It gives
greater  importance  to  anti-submarine  warfare,  anti-missile  and  second  strike
capabilities, as well as the integration of information technology in weapons systems
and  their  links,  and  to  the  reduction  and  professionalisation  of  the  armed  forces.
Reacting  to  the  accelerated  modernisation  of  the  PLA,  the  Taiwanese  army  is
undertaking a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Entitled “renovation of military
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affairs” (junshi shiwu gexin), it is due to be completed by 2012, with the application of
two programmes: bosheng’an , and jingjin’an.
10 Bosheng’an consists of creating operational C41SR27 systems in Taiwan, with a view to
acquiring the capability to carry out joint operations between the three services. It is a
response to American assessments which placed the construction of  C41SR systems
capable of rapidly detecting, reacting to and surviving a Chinese offensive, as the top
priority in the modernisation of the island's defence. The plan aims, with American
assistance, to build a joint command and control centre for the three Taiwanese armed
services  (sanjun  lianhe  zuozhan  xitong).  Its  communications  systems  would  be
integrated with those of the American Pacific Command. According to a report by the
US-China Relations Committee of Congress, Taiwan's progress in this domain has been
“appreciable”28.  In  September  2003,  an  initial  $27  million contract  was  signed with
Lockheed Martin. However, the total cost of the C41SR system will reach $2.1 billion by
2011, and total investment in the programme NT$46.1 billion29.
11 Next  comes  the  improvement  of  Taiwan's  electronic  and  information  warfare
capabilities,  in  particular  to  prevent  a  Chinese  strategy of  “decapitation”  (WWWW,
qunlong wushou), which would consist of paralysing Taiwanese decision-making and
command centres by attacking them electronically30. Today, electronic and information
warfare equipment  takes  up  a  sizeable  part  of  the  investment  expenditure  of  the
Ministry of National Defence: 25.06% in 2001, 32.09% in 2002, 25.46% in 2003, 31.53% in
2004 (or NT$21.1 billion)31.  Counting on its technological lead over China, Taiwan is
fully  integrating  its  high  technology  industries  into  the  project.  Thus,  before  the
project  was  taken over  by the  National  Security  Council,  co-operation between the
industries and the Ministry of National Defence was already a defined task which had
been entrusted to an ad hoc committee under the authority of the Presidential Palace
(a move which had provoked moreover negative reactions in the army)32.
12 Jingjin’an consists of planning a reduction of manpower and the introduction of new
weapons systems. The aim of this restructuring is to build a compact high-tech army.
Thus  Taiwan  is  evolving  towards  greater  professionalisation  of  its  armed  forces,
without  for  the  moment  giving  up  conscription.  Since  January  2004,  the  army has
entered the first stage of jingjin’an. Up to 2006, there will be reductions of 40,000 men,
from 380,000 to 340,000. By 2012, after the implementation of the second stage of the
plan,  the  army  should  only  have  300,000  men.  During  the  same  period,  the
professional/conscript  ratio  will  increase,  from  3.6/6.4  to  6/4.  This  policy  has  two
objectives: the professionalisation of forces in the context of contemporary warfare,
which  demands  in-depth  technical  training  for  many  jobs,  and  the  reduction  of
manpower costs in order to make possible more investment spending. According to a
DPP Parliamentary report,  the plan should make it  possible to reallocate 6% of the
present defence budget to acquisitions. If numbers were reduced to 250,000 troops, as
the  DPP  suggests,  14%  of  the  present  budget  could  be  reallocated  to  productive
investment33.
13 Lastly, between 2000 and 2005, new equipment was acquired by the Taiwanese army,
and new contracts signed. Some of these come under the seal of defence secrecy. In
2004,  18.94%  of  the  defence  budget  remained  secret,  and  mainly  concerned
acquisitions. Other acquisitions are public knowledge. Among the most significant are
four Kidd class destroyers, worth 875 million dollars (two of which have already been
delivered)  and  an  early  warning  radar  surveillance  system  produced  by  Raytheon,
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worth 752 million dollars, which is  scheduled for delivery in 200934.  There are also
numerous missiles which enhance the combat capability of the island's navy and air
force: Harpoon anti-ship missiles, AIM 120, Sidewinder and Sparrow air-to-air missiles,
as well as Hellfire and Maverick air-to-ground missiles. In weapons production, new
developments since 2000 stem from strategic choices made under Lee Teng-hui. The
most  significant  new  development  is  the  decision  to  build a  military  observation
satellite, which is essential in order to improve Taiwanese anti-missile defences, as well
as light armoured vehicles to intervene on the coast in case of a Chinese landing35. Most
of the missiles developed by the Chungshan Technology Institute have already been
deployed on their various carriers, Lafayette and Perry class frigates, IDF fighters, and
Ching-chiang patrol ships, as well as on the ground for the island's anti-air and anti-
missile defences36. The Institute is also working on an improved version of its sea-to-sea
missile (the Hsiung-Feng III),  with the objective of exceeding the capabilities of the
Russian-built Sunburn missiles which China possesses, and which are considered to be
one of the most dangerous weapons in case of a naval confrontation between the two
sides37.  Since Chen's  election,  it  seems that  the previous administration's  efforts  to
develop a medium-range ground-to-ground missile, able to strike military, political or
civilian infrastructure on the Chinese mainland, are receiving renewed attention. Such
a missile would give the Taiwanese forces dissuasive retaliation capability. In August
2005, the Taiwanese press revealed that Hsiung Feng missiles with a range of 1,000
kilometres  would  be  deployed  on  mobile  launchers  by  the  Taiwanese  army's  new
Missile Command38.  This report has not been confirmed by the Ministry of National
Defence39.  However,  in  a  hearing  before  the  Defence  Commission  of  the  legislative
Yuan, the Minister of Defence Lee Jye stated that in future Missile Command would be
made up of only medium-range strategic missiles40. Similarly, under Chen's presidency,
Taiwan has installed, on the islands of Kinmen and Matsu, what were originally anti-
vessel missiles, but which could be fired at the Chinese mainland41.
The limits of the balancing strategy
14 Despite these efforts to modernise both its defence strategy and its armed forces, the
question remains as to whether Taiwan is really acquiring the means to defend itself.
On several occasions, the United States has made no secret of its doubts on that score, it
being understood that Taiwan was counting too much on American protection, and not
enough on its own forces. This American perception stems from the reductions in the
defence  budget.  It  is  also  a  consequence  of  the  confrontation  between  the
administration  and  the  majority  in  Parliament  on  the  subject  of  the  purchase  of
weapons  from  the  United  States.  It  may  well  seem  an  exaggeration  to  talk  about
internal balancing when the Taiwanese defence budget has not been the object of any
significant increase since Chen's election. On the contrary, the budget has remained
stable at a level lower than that of the previous decade (see Table 1). The slowdown in
the island's economic growth and the considerable increase in social spending are the
main  causes  of  this.  The  Ministry  of  National  Defence  hopes  that  the  budget  will
increase to the level of 3% of GDP, a view which is shared in American defence circles.
The authorisation given by the Bush administration in April  2001,  to  sell  Taiwan a
number of  expensive weapons systems should have had the effect  of  producing an
increase in the island's defence budget. However this has not been the case.
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1.Evolution in Taiwan’s Military Spending under the Presidency of Chen Shui-bian
15 The  Chen  administration  has  chosen  a  means  of  financing  which  is  outside  the
boundaries of the regular defence budget for three weapons systems which it considers
essential  to  Taiwan's  defence,  and  in  the  promotion  of  which  it  has  invested
considerable  energy.  Eight  diesel-propelled submarines and twelve P3-C Orion anti-
submarine fighter planes have been chosen in order to remedy Taiwan's vulnerability
to a Chinese blockade. Six batteries of anti-ballistic PAC-III missiles are said to reinforce
Taiwan's  defence  against  Chinese  missiles.  The  constant  improvements  and  the
particular  attention paid  by  the  PLA to  submarines  and missiles  are  said  to  oblige
Taiwan to reinforce its defences against these two weapons systems. A special budget,
which now stands at  US$11 billion,  higher than the 2005 defence budget,  has been
proposed to the legislative Yuan42. This budget was originally US$18 billion when the
Yuan approved it on June 2nd 2004, and then US$15 billion when the administration
decided  to  include  the  purchases  of  PAC-IIIs  in  the  regular  defence  budget43.  No
financial deal has yet been accepted by the parliamentary majority. In March 2006, the
project had already been turned down fifty times in the legislative Yuan. Behind the
political confrontation between the Chen administration and the opposition, beyond
the internal political factors, one can see in these developments an alternative defence
project by the parliamentary majority, which centres on “defensive defence”44. It is said
to be for this reason that the opposition does not seek to block the acquisition of the
P3C Orions,  equipment which is  defensive in nature and which the American army
already operates in the Taiwan Strait.
16 The question of the special arms budget highlights a major feature of Chen Shui-bian's
security policy, which is being implemented in a totally new internal political context:
“The  parliamentary  opposition  outnumbers  the  Presidential  majority”  (WWWW,
chaoxiao yeda), at the very moment when, for the first time in the history of the ROC's
institutions, Parliament has the power to control the defence budget, in accordance
with legislation passed in 2000. Since the approval of the budget by the executive, the
positions  of  the  parliamentary  majority  and  of  the  government  have  remained
irreconcilable, despite numerous attempts at compromise which have given the matter
the dimensions of a soap opera. The opposition refuses to buy the PAC-IIIs,  since it
considers that the results of the defence referendum on March 20th 2004 make their
acquisition illegal45. On the question of the acquisition of submarines, opinion among
the  parliamentary  majority  is  divided.  Some  deputies  in  the  Nationalist  Party
(Kuomintang,  KMT),  such  as  Shuai  Hua-min,  envisage  accepting  the  purchase  of
submarines if their price is reduced46. Others emphasise the fact that the Americans no
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longer produce diesel-propelled submarines and refuse to let the Taiwanese develop a
production facility, as had been demanded by Lin Yu-fang (KMT) and Kao Chung-yuan
(People First Party, PFP)47, which would oblige Taiwan to wait for fifteen years for the
submarines to be operational, in spite of the risk of a conflict breaking out sooner. In
any  case,  there  is  a  consensus  among the  parliamentary  majority  that  the  present
conditions of sale are not acceptable. However, another dimension has to be taken into
account.  Submarines,  which  are  a  strategic  weapon par  excellence, would  give  the
Taiwanese  navy  new  offensive  capability.  It  could  for  example  attack  the  port  of
Shanghai. Their acquisition could have unpredictable effects on cross-Strait relations
and on US-China relations. According to Jane’s Defence Weekly, Taiwan is alleged to
have complained to the Americans that the US Navy was seeking to sabotage Taiwanese
acquisition of submarines. A sign that the security environment of Taiwan has evolved
is that even the American desire to sell submarines to Taiwan should be doubted48.
External balancing: reinforced co-operation with the United States and Japan
17 Chen Shui-bian has met with less opposition in his efforts towards external balancing.
His  administration has  been able  to  seize  a  real  strategic  opportunity:  the  security
dilemma49,  which  is  perceived  by  Koizumi  Junichiro's  Japan  and  George  W.  Bush's
United States in the face of the lack of transparency in the modernisation of the PLA
and in the PRC's strategic intentions. Co-operation in defence matters between America
and Taiwan has  been increased,  but  it  operates  within  a  restrictive  framework for
Taipei, which is linked to Washington's China policy. Since the end of 2003, and Chen's
“defensive  referendum”,  several  voices,  including  that  of  President  Bush,  have
expressed anxiety over certain actions by Taipei,  whose effect could be to alter the
status quo between the two shores. American protection comes with conditions, and
the atmosphere of “strategic clarity” initiated by the decision on arms sales in 2001 has
dissipated,  and  there  has  been  a  return  to  an  ambiguous  position.  In  practice,
Washington  is  currently  following  a  strategy  of  twofold  dissuasion,  against  moves
towards independence and against the use of force by Beijing. The logical connection
between these two dissuasions remains unclear. If Taiwan declares independence, will
the United States oppose the use of force by China? If China chooses a military option,
would a declaration of independence be approved?
18 In July 2004, in Tokyo, Condoleeza Rice, then National Security Advisor, stated publicly
that the United States and Japan should work together on the question of Taiwan. This
was  the  first  time  that  strategic  co-operation  between  Japan  and  America  was
encouraged in  an official  statement.  In  Washington in  February 2005,  during a  2+2
meeting  between  their  Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  of  Defence,  the  two  states
published a joint declaration. For the first time since the signing of the Security Treaty
in  1966,  Tokyo  was  willing  to sign  a  document  which  explicitly  stated  that
“encouraging the peaceful resolution, through dialogue, of questions concerning the
Taiwan  Strait”  is  part  of  “a  common  strategic  interest”,  which  is  shared  with
Washington50. During the crisis in 1996, the United States did not even consult Japan
before  sending  two  aircraft  carriers  to  the  Strait.  One  can  therefore  measure  the
progress which has been made. Taiwan's security is now envisaged on a trilateral level.
Lai I I-chung accurately emphasises that the regenerated alliance between Japan and
America has become a key element in security in the Strait over the last few years51.
19 For  the  government  of  Taiwan,  as  is  the  case  with  its  partners,  this  trilateral  co-
operation is based on shared values, those of democracy and human rights52. The Chen
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administration has clearly expressed its desire to forge a permanent link between the
island's armed forces and the workings of the alliance between Japan and America, in
particular  by  developing  along  with  the  United  States  and  Japan  the  anti-missile
defences around Formosa53. If Taiwan were incorporated into a defence system which
was managed trilaterally, any attack on the island would be equivalent to an attack on
the United States and Japan. While this is not yet the case, certain measures have been
taken in the direction of increasing military co-operation. In the United States, certain
elements of the planned Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (TSEA) have in fact been put
into practice by the Bush administration, even though the law has not been passed54.
Examples  include  the  necessity  for  the  United  States  to  clarify  its  commitment  to
defend Taiwan, exchanges of military personnel between Washington and Taipei, the
installation  of  direct  communications  between  the  two  High  Commands,  the
participation by American advisers in the annual Hanguang military exercises, and the
end of the ban on visits by high-ranking military officials, exemplified by the visit paid
to the United States in 2002 by Tang Yao-ming, who was Minister of Defence at the
time. According to Michael Swaine, it is with Taiwan that the American armed forces
have the most co-operation programmes under way55. In Japan, Tokyo has engaged in
active  support  of  Taiwan's  participation  as  an  observer  in  certain  international
organisations  which  do  not  require  state  status  (such  as  the  World  Health
Organisation),  in  Track II  trilateral  security  discussions  with  the  United States  and
Taiwan,  in  increasing  parliamentary  exchanges  with  Taiwan,  and  in  inter-military
contacts with the Taiwanese56.  At the beginning of 2003, for the first time since the
diplomatic rift in 1972, a Japanese military man was posted to Taipei: Nagano Yoichi, a
retired general in the land-based component of the Self-Defence Forces, holds the post
of director of the Japanese delegation to Taiwan, the Japanese Exchange Association
(riben jiaoliu xiehui)57. Another strong signal, according to the Taiwanese media, was
the participation of a delegation of officers from the Taiwanese self-defence forces in
the annual Hanguang military exercises in March 200558.
The “ securitisation” of exchanges between the two shores
20 Taiwan's  security  agenda  in  relation  to  China  goes  beyond  the  military  sphere.  It
demonstrates an “all security” approach, to the extent that any interaction with the
Chinese mainland poses for Taiwan a security problem which is  societal,  economic,
technological  and  even  political.  On  the  level  of  exchanges  with  China,  the  Chen
administration has in substance changed the approach followed under Lee Teng-hui,
whose political  line towards China was “no haste,  be patient” (jieji  yongren).  Since
2000, two new economic policies have been implemented: “positive opening, efficient
management” (jiji kaifang, youxiao guanli) and “strengthening the base, opening to the
West”  (qiangben  xijin).  These  two  slogans  emphasise  the  necessary  pendulum
movement between prudent opening towards the mainland and management of the
security  risks  for  Taiwan.  While  exchanges have been made easier  and continue to
increase, a number of restrictions have been maintained. The example of direct air and
sea  links  is  illuminating  in  this  regard.  In  the  present  circumstances  of  political
confrontation, Taipei does not believe in peace through exchanges with the People's
Republic. In August 2003, the Mainland Affairs Commission (MAC) published a report
assessing the consequences for Taiwan of opening direct links59.  This document still
represents the official  position of the island's government.  An entire section of the
report is devoted to assessing the security risks for Taiwan. It highlights the negative
effects on Taiwan's economy, on the island's status, its international image, its social
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balance, its military security, its technological lead over China, as well as the denial of
Taiwan's  sovereignty  which  it  perceives  in  the  conditions  offered  by  Beijing.  The
Commission  expounds  a  protectionist  argument,  according  to  which  the  weakest
sectors  of  the  Taiwanese  economy  would  not  survive  the  competition  from  the
mainland in a situation of liberalisation of exchanges across the Strait.  It  expresses
alarm  over  the  accelerating  delocalisation  of  industry  to  the  mainland60.  The
Commission also raises the question of “political security”, which is not confined to a
perception of direct links as harmful to the defence of the sovereignty of the ROC in
Taiwan. It also includes the idea that democracy and the rule of law would be indirectly
threatened by the opening up towards China, and is based on the perception of the
conflict between the two shores as being not a conflict of sovereignty but rather an
ideological  struggle  between  a  democracy  and  an  authoritarian  regime61.  Before
opening direct links, the administration must set up a security net which will allow
Taiwan to minimise the security risks. This term must be understood as the application
of strategies of diversification, of increasing Taiwan's competitivity in order to better
turn to its own advantage the division of labour between the two shores, improved
legislation on technology transfer between the two shores which will allow Taiwan to
maintain its lead, but also costly modifications in the deployment of the Taiwanese
armed forces and border police. Taipei insists that China accept the involvement of
Taiwanese  government  agencies  in  the  process  of  negotiation,  both  for  technical
reasons and in order not to sacrifice the island's sovereignty62.
21 This approach distances itself from the middle way which brought Chen Shui-bian to
the presidency in 2000. This is especially so as, in January 2006, Chen set out a new
slogan “positive opening, efficient management”, which suggests that more restrictive
policies will be applied in order to manage exchanges between the two shores63. As is
shown by the former President of the Mainland Affairs Commission (MAC), Su Chi, the
DPP,  once  in  power,  has  shifted  from  a  position  which  consisted  of  all-out
encouragement of exchanges with mainland China to an approach which seeks to slow
them down and restrict them64. In reality Taipei's policy takes up the arguments of the
most  independence-minded  fringes  of  the  political  class.  The  example  of  the
international conference on “cross–Strait exchanges and national security” organised
in Taipei in November 2003 by Lee Teng-hui's “Taiwan Advocates” association, in the
presence of Vice-President Annette Lü Xiu-lian, is significant65. The contributors, a very
large  majority  of  whom were  researchers  or  politicians  close  to  the  DPP or  to  the
Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), set out arguments which sought to demonstrate that
the cost/benefit ratio is unfavourable to the opening of direct air links, on all the levels
of the island's security, including its psychological defences, its public health security
and its  social  security.  The Taiwanese daily  with the highest  circulation,  the  Ziyou
Shibao (Liberty Times),  also states its  opposition to the opening of  direct  links,  for
reasons of national security. On the contrary, the KMY KMT and the PFP call for their
being opened, as do the two other major dailies, the Lianhebao (United Daily News) and
the Zhongguo Shibao (China Times).
22 As Denny Roy's expression “the enemy within” reminds us, Taiwan has not succeeded
in achieving an internal consensus on the perception of China as either a threat or an
opportunity  for  the  pursuit  of  its  development66.  This  is  one  of  the  fundamental
divisions between the presidential majority and the opposition. According to the DPP
the blocking of the arms budget by the parliamentary majority, and the journeys by
Lien Chan and James Soong to the mainland have a negative effect on the “defensive
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spirit” (guofang yizhi)67.  To the presidential majority, Taiwan has to face a “protean
war of attrition”, as is emphasised by the President of the TSU, Su Chin-qiang68. With
this formulation, he offers a reminder that China applies against Taiwan the strategy of
the “Three Wars”, using the law, public opinion and psychology. In the face of this
offensive, the Chen administration has engaged in a policy which aims to work on the
“defensive spirit”  of  the Taiwanese population.  The White Paper formulates  in this
respect  the  concept  of  “all-out  defence”,  which  is  understood  as  the  Taiwanese
population's capacity to withstand a conflict with the PRC in time of war, but also as
the population's determination to resist political strong arm tactics in peacetime69. The
DPP's emphasis on the “consciousness of being Taiwanese” (Taiwan zhutixing), and its
rhetoric, which presents the opposition's mainland policy as an abdication in the face
of Beijing's irredentism, have to be understood in this context.
The failure of the implementation of a framework for peaceful interaction 
23 Internal and external balancing, prudence in interactions with China, and working on
the  psychological  defences  of  the  population  seem  to  be  a  rational  approach  to
defending the sovereignty of the ROC. This is all the more so since a whole aspect of the
security policy planned by the DPP before it came to power has proved to be a failure:
functionalist peace and collective security, which could have led, as the DPP saw it, to a
relaxing of security in relations between the two sides.
24 The desire to apply bilateral security arrangements with Beijing, and to incorporate
Taiwan into regional security arrangements, dates back to the presidency of Lee Teng-
hui. In August 1991, he was one of the first Asian heads of state to propose regional
security  arrangements  in  the  Asia  Pacific,  including  the  United  States  and  Japan.
However, when the Council for Co-operation and Security in the Asia Pacific and above
all the ASEAN regional forum (ARF) were founded, in 1993 and 1994, Taiwan was unable
to take part. Because of Beijing's refusal to allow Taiwan to participate in international
organisations which require state status, the island is cut off from multilateral security
mechanisms.  Thus  the  security  of  the  Strait  is  never  on  the  agenda  of  major
international conferences. Still today, every year, a Taiwanese delegation attempts to
bring pressure to bear in order to impose Taiwan's participation in the ARF, which is
perceived as the regional forum most likely to reduce the insecurity of the island's
position. Even in the absence of the Taiwanese, Beijing refuses to have the question of
stability in the Strait of Taiwan put on the agenda of this annual conference70.
25 Similarly, Taipei has up to now been unsuccessful in its project to establish with Beijing
a “code of behaviour on both sides of the Strait” and “confidence-building measures
between the two sides”. Both these projects, based on a long-term vision of a “structure
of stability and peace for exchanges between the two shores sides”, aim to reduce the
danger of a military incident between the two sides. They are the continuation of a
policy proposed by Lee Teng-hui, fairly late on, in April 1999; the “mechanism for peace
and stability in the Strait”, which is based on European experience. In the White Paper
put  forward by  the  DPP in  1999  during the  election campaign,  confidence-building
measures already occupied a prominent place71. Chen Shui-bian seems to grant them
particular attention. Since his re-election in March 2004, he has regularly reiterated
and  elaborated  on  these  proposals  in  several  speeches72.  The  confidence-building
measures (CBMs, or in Chinese xinxin jianli cuoshi) have been the subject of detailed
thinking in Taiwan. The 2004 White Paper describes the stages envisaged by Taiwan:
demonstrations of good will leading to the signing of an agreement to end hostilities73.
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While  there is  no mechanism between the two sides  for  security  dialogue or  crisis
management,  whether  bilateral,  or  even  more  unthinkable,  incorporated  into  a
multilateral  framework,  confidence-building  measures  are  sorely  lacking  in  the
maintenance of stability in the Strait74.  What would happen in case of an air or sea
incident on the tacitly accepted frontier between the two shores, which runs along the
middle  of  the  Strait75?  How  could  such  crises  be  managed  quickly  and  effectively
without appropriate channels of communication? To Beijing, the signing of CBMs can
only be envisaged between sovereign states. On May 17th 2004, the Bureau of Taiwan
Affairs made public a declaration in which it proposed establishing CBMs with Taiwan
on the single condition that the island recognise the One China principle as defined by
Beijing, a condition which is unacceptable to Taipei76. On this point also, agreement is
impossible unless one of the two sides makes a major concession on the question of the
status of Taiwan.
26 The Chen administration has sought to build peace with China without renouncing the
independent  sovereignty  of  Taiwan,  and  by  trying  to  impose  on  Beijing  the
“normalisation  of  cross-Strait  relations”  (zhengchanghua),  which  is  to  say  the
recognition of that status. At the beginning of his first mandate, Chen proposed a policy
of integration between the two sides,  which was presented as a  functionalist  peace
policy. At the heart of this approach is the ambition to build a dynamic peace based on
horizontal exchanges: a working peace, in the search for a definitive peace, through a
build-up of common benefits77. As noted by Byron Weng, this is not a unification policy,
for integration aims at uniting two sovereign entities in a process without constraint,
free and voluntary, but which does not blend them into a centralised unit, and respects
the aspects of separation between these two entities78. In his New Year speech in 2001,
Chen stated that “the integration of our economies, of our trade and of our culture can
be a starting point to gradually building belief and confidence in each other. This, in
turn, can be the basis of a new structure for permanent peace and political integration”
79. This policy has come up against the choice made by China not to respond to the olive
branches held out by Taipei as long as the island has not yielded on the principle of One
China.  Without  any  inter-governmental  dialogue,  the  policy  simply  cannot  be
implemented, and has been abandoned by the Taiwanese administration. Nevertheless,
one can wonder about the motivations behind a political project unacceptable to China,
since it assumed the recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign political entity.
27 This security policy is an interesting illustration of the concept of securitisation put
forward by Ole Waever, which designates a language act consisting of including in the
spectrum of a state's security policy a problem which is not necessarily part of it. Ole
Waever notes that the whole redefinition of the concept of security in the 1980s was
carried out by a series of additions: security is not only the military security of a state,
“but also…”. Thus, in theory, any security policy is contained between two extremes:
maximum  securitisation  and  maximum  desecuritisation80.  While  Beijing  and  Taipei
maintain irreconcilable positions on the island's status and on the definition of the
status  quo  between  the  two  sides,  the  Chen  administration  favours  maximum
securitisation, and only strong internal policy constraints, the attraction to Taiwanese
private players of the mainland economy, and the reservations sometimes shown by
the United States prevent him from applying maximum securitisation to cross-Strait
relations. These are important reservations, but from there to the desecuritisation of
his China policy is an enormous step, which cannot be taken without agreement on the
question of the status of Taiwan. For as long as Taipei seeks to “normalise” relations
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between the two sides, without any concession on China's part, security policies based
on collective security, CBMs, positive-sum games, and a liberal peace will all be doomed
to failure. For the same reason, Chinese advances, whether conditional or not on the
acceptance of the One China principle, will logically be perceived as forming part of a
united front strategy against the island. On the other hand, the effort to maximise its
military power and the prudent management of relations between the two sides from a
security viewpoint will  be the only two levers left  to Taiwan in order to defend its
position as a sovereign state.
28 Translated from the French original by Michael Black
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RÉSUMÉS
The passing of the Anti-Secession Law, on March 14th 2005, was a reminder that the People's
Republic of China has not renounced the use of force against Taiwan. Following the election of
Chen Shui-bian in March 2000, the positions of the governments on both sides of the Taiwan
Strait have hardened. Beijing demands from Taipei a recognition of the “one China” principle in
order  to  resume  dialogue,  while  Taipei  considers  the  Republic  of  China  in  Taiwan  to  be  a
sovereign  and  independent  state. This  article  describes  the range  of  means—including
modernisation  of  the  military,  reinforced  military  co-operation  with  the  United  States,  and
increasingly with Japan, as well as restrictions on various forms of exchanges between the two
sides—  which  are  used  by  the  Chen  Shui-bian  government  to  resist  Chinese  irredentism.  It
emphasises the continuity with Lee Teng-hui's security policy, and the new constraints which
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affect the Taiwanese executive, in particular the refusal by the opposition parties, which control
the  majority  of  seats  in  the  Legislative  Yuan,  to  approve  the  government's  plans  for  arms
acquisitions.
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